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INTRODUCTION 
The writ of habeas corpus was once seen as the great protector of 
the people against the overwhelming power of the State;1 now its 
reputation has shrunk to little more than a stall tactic.2 As Congress 
and the courts have increasingly disfavored the “Great Writ,” its 
power to grant relief has nearly evaporated.3 Although some of the 
writ’s recent diminishment was necessary to keep judicial proceedings 
from dragging on too long,4 some commenters believe that the writ’s 
power has been curtailed too much, and that it is no longer an 
effective enough tool for those in need of its protection.5 As the courts 
continue to stake out the borders of habeas procedure, some 
jurisdictions have continued to impose even greater restrictions on 
habeas petitioners, such as requiring successful petitioners to file 
unnecessary motions and cross-appeals to fully defend their 
judgments. These courts have overstepped, however, and the Supreme 
Court has before it a chance to stop the erosion of the writ’s power. 
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 1.  See Lynn Adelman, Federal Habeas Review of State Court Convictions: Incoherent Law 
but an Essential Right, 64 ME. L. REV. 379, 380–81 (2012) (noting that habeas corpus has long 
been known “the Great Writ of Liberty”). 
 2. See Larry Yackle, AEDPA Mea Culpa, 24 FED. SENT’G. REP. 329, 330 (noting that 
many have concluded that prisoners file habeas petitions solely to delay execution of capital 
sentences). 
 3.  Id. at 384–85 (noting that habeas petitions are granted so infrequently that some have 
argued the writ is no longer needed in non-capital cases). 
 4.  See John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson, & Keir M. Weyble, In Defense of Noncapital 
Habeas: A Response to Hoffman and King, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 435, 441–42 (2011) (compiling 
recent changes in habeas law and noting Congress’s intention for these changes to shorten 
judicial proceedings). 
 5.  See, e.g., Adelman, supra note 1, at 384.  
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The question presented in Jennings v. Stephens6 is whether a 
habeas petitioner, after winning at the district court on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, needs to file a cross-appeal and a 
motion for a certificate of appealability for the circuit court of appeals 
to consider an additional argument supporting that ineffective 
assistance claim, even though the district court rejected that 
additional argument.7 This question has received mixed answers from 
the federal circuit courts. The Supreme Court should rule in favor of 
the petitioner, Jennings, because by prevailing at the district court 
level, habeas petitioners have shown the merit of their claims. Forcing 
habeas petitioners to present motions and briefs, which no longer 
serve their gate-keeping functions, only hinders judicial efficiency. 
This case also presents the Court with an opportunity to weigh in 
on another deep circuit split over whether an attorney’s errors can be 
considered cumulatively in ineffective assistance of counsel cases. This 
is an important question because repeated errors by counsel can 
sometimes be just as harmful as one egregious error, and can just as 
easily deny a defendant his Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance counsel.8 The Court should therefore rule in favor of the 
habeas petitioner on this issue as well, as the petitioner’s stance has 
the better policy rationale and brings greater uniformity to habeas 
law. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On July 19, 1988, Robert Jennings shot and killed Officer Elston 
Howard of the Houston Police Department during a botched robbery 
attempt at a local adult bookstore. Jennings was tried for capital 
murder and found guilty by the jury after one hour of deliberation.9 
During the penalty phase, the State sought the death penalty and 
presented evidence of Jennings’s extensive criminal history.10 
 
 6.  Jennings v. Stephens, 537 F. App’x 326 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. granted in part, 134 S. Ct. 
1539 (2014). 
 7.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 37, Jennings v. Stephens, No. 13-7211 (U.S. Oct. 28, 
2013), 2013 WL 8116856, at *37. 
 8.  See Michael C. McLaughlin, It Adds Up: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and the 
Cumulative Deficiency Doctrine, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 859, 879 (2014) (calling for the Supreme 
Court to take up the issue of the theory of cumulative prejudice at its first opportunity). 
 9.  Brief for the Respondent, Jennings v. Stephens at 2, No. 13-7211 (U.S. Aug. 12, 2014), 
2014 WL 3945237, at *2. 
 10.  The prosecution introduced evidence that Jennings had been declared a delinquent 
and placed on probation when he was fourteen and was sent to a trade school as a condition of 
his probation at fifteen. Jennings, 537 F. App’x at 328. At age sixteen, Jennings was sent to a 
O'BRIEN 1.12.15 FINAL READ VERSION (DO NOT DELETE) 1/16/2015  1:30 PM 
2015] JENNINGS V. STEVENS AND JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY IN HABEAS APPEALS 23 
Jennings’s trial counsel hoped to mitigate the sentence by having 
Jennings testify about his troubled upbringing—he had been 
conceived as the result of rape, grew up in poverty with no father 
figure, and was raised by a drug-addicted mother who resented him 
for being born and disrupting her education.11 Jennings’s counsel also 
requested that Jennings be allowed to testify without being subject to 
cross-examination, but the trial court denied this request, and 
Jennings did not testify.12 
Jennings’s counsel subsequently presented only one witness 
during sentencing: George Burrell, a chaplain in the Harris County 
Sherriff’s Office.13 Burrell testified that he had met Jennings shortly 
after his most recent arrest. Based on his multiple visits each week, 
Burrell testified that he did not think that Jennings was 
“incorrigible.”14 Burrell was also unaware of any disciplinary 
violations committed by Jennings during his time in jail and felt that 
Jennings had “changed” since their first meeting.15 He further testified 
that Jennings was an asset to his ministry, and that Jennings helped 
provide support to other inmates.16 
No other mitigating evidence was presented in Jennings’s 
defense.17 In his closing argument, Jennings’s attorney said, “I feel like 
I ought to just sit down. Shoot, you twelve people know what the 
evidence is. You’ve heard it. You’ve probably already decided what 
you’re going to do with Jennings in this case.”18 He urged the jurors to 
consider all of the facts and to refrain from voting too quickly for 
death.19 He stated that because he lived and worked in the same 
county as the jurors and cared about the safety of the community, he 
 
juvenile facility for a probation violation, and at seventeen, he was convicted of aggravated 
robbery and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. Id. Then, at twenty, he was convicted of 
burglarizing a home and two more aggravated robberies (this time, he was sentenced to two 
concurrent thirty-year sentences, and while serving that sentence, he committed thirteen prison 
disciplinary violations); and within two months of his release, he committed six aggravated 
robberies and killed Officer Howard. Id.  
 11.  Jennings v. Thaler, No. H–09–219, 2012 WL 1440387, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2012). 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Jennings, 537 F. App’x at 328. 
 15.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7, at *3. 
 16.  Brief for the Respondent, supra note 9, at *2. 
 17.  Jennings, 537 F. App’x at 328. 
 18.  Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Jennings v. Stephens, No. 13-721 (U.S. June 6, 2014) 2014 
WL 2601476, at *4. 
 19.  Brief for the Respondent, supra note 9, at *2–3. 
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could not “quarrel with” a decision to put Jennings to death,20 but said, 
“[I]f you can, I ask you to find . . . mitigation.”21 The jury, however, 
found no mitigating factors and Jennings was sentenced to death.22 
Jennings appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which 
affirmed his death sentence in an unpublished decision.23 He next 
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, but the Court denied 
certiorari.24 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals subsequently denied 
his state habeas corpus application in 2008, and his petition for 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was again denied.25 
In 2009 Jennings filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the 
Southern District ofTexas.26 In his petition, Jennings asserted that he 
had received ineffective assistance of counsel during his sentencing 
hearing.27 He argued that his trial counsel was deficient for failing to 
call Jennings, his sister, or his mother, for failing to find and present 
any evidence of Jennings’s mental health issues, and for offering a 
closing argument that was prejudicial to Jennings.28 The district court 
found that, although there were definite risks involved in calling 
Jennings or his mother to the stand, counsel’s reasons29 for not calling 
Jennings’s sister “made no sense,” and that refusing to call any 
member of the Jennings family “was not sound trial strategy.”30 In 
reaching its decision that counsel was deficient, the court pointed to 
Wiggins v. Smith,31 which it said “makes clear that failure to present 
available significant mitigating evidence resulting in the virtual 
absence of a mitigation case is deficient performance.”32 
 
 
 
 20.  Jennings v. Thaler, No. H–09–219, 2012 WL 1440387, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2012). 
 21.  Brief for the Respondent, supra note 9, at *3. 
 22.  Jennings, 2012 WL 1440387, at *3. 
 23.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 18, at *4. 
 24.  Jennings v. Texas, 510 U.S. 830, 830 (1993). 
 25.  Jennings, 2012 WL 1440387, at *1. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at *3. 
 28.  Id. at *3–6. 
 29.  Counsel stated that he did not think Jennings’s sister, who was ten when Jennings 
entered the juvenile justice system, was old enough to remember pertinent events. Id. at *4. 
 30.  Id. Moreover, “[w]hatever damage counsel may have feared from cross examination of 
Jennings or Mrs. Jennings’s hostility toward her son is far outweighed by the damage caused by 
presenting no evidence at all of Jennings’s background, i.e., giving the jury no reason not to 
impose a death sentence.” Id. (emphasis in original). 
 31.  Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 32.  Jennings, 2012 WL 1440387, at *4. 
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The district court also found that Jennings’s counsel was deficient 
for failing to find and present evidence of Jennings’s mental health.33 
A prior psychological evaluation performed on Jennings to determine 
his competence to stand trial revealed that he had an IQ of 65 and 
mild organic brain dysfunction as the result of a childhood injury.34 
However, the evaluation also noted that Jennings was “malingering” 
during his evaluation in order to appear incompetent to stand trial.35  
The district court found the state court’s determination that counsel 
was not deficient for failing to present this evidence to be 
unreasonable. The state court had considered the report unreliable 
because Jennings was malingering during his examination, but the 
district court noted that the report acknowledged Jennings’s 
malingering but still concluded he had mild organic brain 
dysfunction.36 
The federal district court was not persuaded, however, that the 
closing argument constituted deficient performance.37 The court 
determined that Jennings’s counsel was attempting to identify with 
the jurors while still convincing them that a death sentence was 
inappropriate, and therefore found that the state court was reasonable 
in determining that the closing argument did not constitute deficient 
performance.38 
Finally, the court held that the deficiencies of Jennings’s counsel 
prejudiced him during the sentencing phase.39 The court dismissed the 
State’s motion for summary judgment and granted Jennings’s habeas 
petition.40 The State was ordered to release Jennings from custody 
unless it granted Jennings a new sentencing hearing or resentenced 
him to a term of imprisonment within 120 days.41 
The State appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the district 
court.42 The Fifth Circuit found that Jennings was not prejudiced by 
his counsel’s failure to present testimony of his disadvantaged 
background or to investigate and present evidence of his mental 
 
 33.  Id. at *5. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id.  
 37.  Id. at *6. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. at *6–7. 
 40.  Id. at *7. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Jennings v. Stephens, 537 F. App’x 326, 339 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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health.43 The court also held that Jennings was barred from arguing 
that his counsel provided ineffective assistance at closing argument 
because Jennings had not filed a notice of appeal, had failed to seek a 
certificate of appealability from the district court, and had not filed a 
motion for a certificate of appealability with the circuit court until 
well after the appeal had already been briefed.44 The court denied his 
motion for a certificate of appealability, dismissed his “cross-point” of 
counsel’s ineffective closing argument, and reversed the district 
court’s judgment granting habeas relief on the merits.45 
In response to the Fifth Circuit’s ruling, Jennings filed a petition 
for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.46 He 
claimed, inter alia, that the Fifth Circuit erred by holding: (1) that 
Jennings’s counsel’s failure to present evidence of Jennings’s 
background was not deficient;47 (2) that his counsel’s failure to present 
evidence of his mental impairment was not prejudicial;48 and (3) “that 
a federal habeas petitioner who prevailed in the district court on an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim must file a separate notice of 
appeal and motion for a certificate of appealability to raise an 
allegation of deficient performance that the district court rejected.”49 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question of 
whether Jennings needed to file a cross-appeal and a motion for a 
certificate of appealability after being granted his habeas petition in 
federal district court.50 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  AEDPA and the Tightening of Habeas Corpus Standards 
In 1996 Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act (AEDPA)51 with the purpose of streamlining habeas 
corpus cases.52 The Supreme Court, which had been putting 
 
 43.  Id. at 334–35. 
 44.  Id. at 338. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7, at *1. 
 47.  Id. at *6. 
 48.  Id. at *7. 
 49.  Id. at *11. 
 50.  Jennings v. Stephens, 134 S. Ct. 1539 (2014). 
 51.  Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(1996) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.A.). 
 52.  Brooke N. Wallace, Uniform Application of Habeas Corpus Jurisprudence: The 
Trouble with Applying Section 2244's Statute of Limitations Period, 79 TEMPLE L. REV. 703, 703 
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restrictions on habeas review in the years immediately preceding the 
bill, interpreted the AEDPA’s purpose to be “further[ing] the 
principles of comity, finality, and federalism.”53 The bill was promoted 
as a way to reduce the number of successful death penalty challenges 
and to reduce the delay from those proceedings.54 Further, the bill 
sought to curtail the reach of the federal courts into state court 
proceedings.55 
The bill enabled these ends by heightening the standards for 
relief.56 AEDPA speaks specifically to federal court review of state 
court decisions in 28 U.S.C. § 2254.57 This section requires a federal 
court to determine that the state court’s adjudication “resulted in a 
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application 
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based 
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 
presented in the state court proceeding.”58 This constraint requires the 
federal court to give great deference to the state court’s ruling, and 
does not require the state court to be correct, but only “reasonable.”59 
This in turn has served to lessen the effectiveness of the federal 
habeas petition by making it more difficult for petitioners to 
overcome the state court’s ruling. 
B.  Habeas Review of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
The Supreme Court has taken the restrictive standards of AEDPA 
and extended them even further for habeas claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. The current standard for ineffective assistance 
was set pre-AEDPA in 1984 by the Court’s holding in Strickland v. 
Washington.60 In Strickland, the Court laid out the two prongs of an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim: (1) “counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed 
the defendant by the Sixth Amendment”; and (2) “the deficient 
 
(2006). For a comparison of pre- and post-AEDPA habeas law. see Larry W. Yackle, A Primer 
on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381, 381 (1996),  
 53.  Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 (2001) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 
436 (2000)). 
 54.  Adelman, supra note 1, at 384. 
 55.  Yackle, supra note 52, at 329–30. 
 56.  Adelman, supra note 1, at 384. 
 57.  Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 783 (2011). 
 58.  28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2014). 
 59.  Adelman, supra note 1, at 384. 
 60.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
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performance prejudiced the defense.”61 To satisfy the prejudice prong 
of the claim, the Court required the errors to be “so serious as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial.”62 In death penalty sentencing, 
“the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent 
the errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.”63 
Though the Court did not specifically define what constitutes a 
“reasonable probability,” they gave some guidance by stating that the 
probability must be “sufficient to undermine the confidence of the 
result.”64 
AEDPA heightened the standard under which all federal habeas 
cases are reviewed even further. Under AEDPA, a federal court 
deciding a habeas claim “must determine what arguments or theories 
supported or . . . could have supported, the state court’s decision; and 
then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could 
disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the 
holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.”65 The standard for 
ineffective assistance in habeas is thus “doubly deferential” to the 
state court.66 
Though the Supreme Court has “declined to articulate specific 
guidelines for appropriate attorney conduct,”67 it has provided several 
examples of attorney performances that do not satisfy the highly 
deferential standards. In Williams v. Taylor, the Court held that 
counsel’s failure to search for records describing the petitioner’s 
“nightmarish childhood,” because counsel mistakenly thought access 
to the records was barred by state law, constituted deficient 
performance.68 Additionally in Wiggins v. Smith, the Court concluded 
that the attorney’s performance fell below the deferential standard 
for ineffective assistance where counsel, in a death penalty case, failed 
to investigate beyond the presentence report and social services 
record for mitigating factors.69 
 
 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. at 695. 
 64.  Id. at 694. 
 65.  Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011). 
 66.  Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 112 (2009). 
 67.  Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). 
 68.  Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395 (2000).  
 69.  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524. 
O'BRIEN 1.12.15 FINAL READ VERSION (DO NOT DELETE) 1/16/2015  1:30 PM 
2015] JENNINGS V. STEVENS AND JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY IN HABEAS APPEALS 29 
The federal circuits are split on several issues related to 
determining the standards for ineffective assistance of counsel. First, 
the circuits differ on whether each instance of deficient performance 
should be considered individually or cumulatively when determining 
whether the petitioner was prejudiced under the second prong of 
Strickland.70 The Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have 
rejected the theory that deficiency can be cumulated,71 while the 
Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have accepted the theory.72 The 
Eleventh Circuit recently noted the lack of Supreme Court precedent 
on this topic, and deferred to a state court’s decision rather than take 
a position.73 Not surprisingly, the circuit courts are also split the same 
way over whether multiple instances of deficiency are part of one 
unitary ineffective assistance claim or if they are each their own 
individual claim.74 
C.  Cross-appeals and Certificates of Appealability 
Petitioners whose habeas petitions are denied at the district court 
level are required to do two things before they can have their cases 
heard by the circuit court: (1) file a timely notice of appeal;75 and (2) 
obtain a certificate of appealability.76 While filing a notice of appeal is 
 
 70.  See generally McLaughlin, supra note 8. 
 71.  See, e.g., Sutton v. Bell, 645 F.3d 752, 755 (6th Cir. 2011); Fisher v. Angelone, 163 F.3d 
835, 852 (4th Cir. 1998); Wainwright v. Lockhart, 80 F.3d 1226, 1233 (8th Cir. 1996); Jones v. 
Stotts, 59 F.3d 143, 147 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 72.  See, e.g., Harris ex rel. Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995); Williams 
v. Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 1995); Rodriguez v. Hoke, 928 F.2d 534, 538 (2d Cir. 
1991). 
 73.  See Forrest v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 342 F. App’x 560, 564–65 (11th Cir. 2009) (“The 
Supreme Court has not directly addressed the applicability of the cumulative error doctrine in 
the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.”). 
 74.  See, e.g., Fisher, 163 F.3d at 852 (“To the extent this Court has not specifically stated 
that ineffective assistance of counsel claims . . . must be reviewed individually, rather than 
collectively, we do so now.”); United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1241 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(rejecting the theory that “an ineffectiveness claim may be viewed as unitary, regardless of the 
number of separate reasons advanced in support of the claim”); but see Peoples v. United States, 
403 F.3d 844, 847–48 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that ineffectiveness is a single claim); Babbitt v. 
Woodford, 177 F.3d 744 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that two deficiencies constituted the same 
ineffective assistance claim). 
 75.  FED. R. APP. P. 3(a)(1) (“An appeal permitted by law as of right from a district court 
to a court of appeals may be taken only by filing a notice of appeal with the district clerk within 
the time allowed by Rule 4.”). 
 76.  28 U.S.C.A. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (West 2014) (“Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 
certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from . . . [t]he 
final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of 
process issued by a State court[.]”). 
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guaranteed as an option by law,77 a motion for a certificate of 
appealability may be granted “only if the applicant has made a 
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”78 The 
motion also must indicate “which specific issue or issues” satisfy that 
substantial showing requirement.79 These stringent requirements for 
the issuance of a certificate of appealability do not apply when the 
State takes the appeal itself.80 
The Supreme Court held in El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie 
that in civil cases, a party who prevailed in the district court must file 
a cross-appeal when seeking an expanded judgment in their favor, 
beyond what the district court granted them.81 However, the Court 
held in United States v. American Railway Express Co. that a cross-
appeal is not required in civil cases for an appellee to add extra 
arguments on appeal to support his favorable judgment below, even if 
those arguments “attack” the reasoning the lower court used to reach 
that result.82 
With respect to certificates of appealability in habeas cases, the 
federal circuits are split on whether § 2253 applies to petitioners who 
are granted relief in district court and subsequently requires them to 
acquire a certificate of appealability before advancing an argument 
not adopted by the district court.83 The Seventh Circuit has held that 
habeas petitioners do not need a certificate of appealability after 
being granted relief in the distrct court, determining that § 2253 “deals 
only with appeals by prisoners; it does not mention arguments by 
prisoners as appellees offered in support of relief they have 
obtained.”84 However, the Fifth and Second Circuits have each held 
that § 2253 does apply to habeas petitioners as appellees, and have 
required a certificate of appealability when raising alternate grounds 
for relief even after the relief was ultimately obtained below.85 
 
 77.  FED. R. APP. P. (3)(a)(1). 
 78.  28 U.S.C.A. § 2253(c)(2) (West 2014). 
 79.  Id. at § 2253(c)(3). 
 80.  FED. R. APP. P. 22(b)(3) (“A certificate of appealability is not required when a state or 
its representative or the United States or its representative appeals.”). 
 81.  El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 473 (1999). 
 82.  United States v. Am. Ry. Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435–36 (1924). 
 83.  Jennings v. Stephens, 537 F. App’x 326, 338 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 84.  Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 397 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 85.  See Wiley v. Epps, 625 F.3d 199, 204 n.2 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting that petitioner failed to 
seek a certificate of appealability for an alternate ground and rejecting the ground as a result); 
Grotto v. Herbert, 316 F.3d 198, 209 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[A] habeas petitioner to whom the writ has 
been granted on one or more grounds may not assert, in opposition to an appeal by the state, 
any ground that the district court has not adopted unless the petitioner obtains a certificate of 
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III.  ARGUMENTS 
A.  Arguments for Jennings 
Jennings advances two alternate reasons for reversing the Fifth 
Circuit. He first argues that a habeas petitioner who was granted 
relief in the district court should not be required to cross-appeal or 
file a motion for a certificate of appealability if he is not seeking to 
expand his relief.86 Alternatively, he argues that even if a certificate of 
appealability and a cross-appeal are required to raise a different claim 
from the one the petitioner prevailed on below, neither were required 
here because Jennings was only asserting an additional ground for 
deficient performance—not an additional claim—because ineffective 
assistance should be considered a single claim regardless of the 
number of instances of deficient performance by counsel.87 
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure state that an appeal 
“may be taken” by filing timely notice of appeal.88 Jennings argues 
that this does not apply to him because he was not taking an appeal—
the State was.89 He further contends that the cross-appeal rules from 
the civil cases, American Railway and Neztsosie, are applicable to 
habeas cases as well and only requires a cross-appeal when the 
petitioner seeks to enlarge the judgment in his favor by requesting 
additional relief, such as when a party is granted some injunctions and 
denied others in district court, but seeks to have all those injunctions 
granted on appeal.90 Because Jennings was granted all the relief he 
requested—a new sentencing hearing—raising arguments that the 
district court rejected would not enlarge his relief.91 He supplements 
his point92 with the policy argument advanced by now-Chief Judge 
Easterbrook in Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., that cross-appeals solely 
for advancing an argument in support of the judgment are 
unnecessary and waste judicial resources by adding to the number of 
briefs, thereby delaying the case.93 
 
 
appealability permitting him to argue that ground.”). 
 86.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 18, at *7. 
 87.  Id. at 8. 
 88.  FED. R. APP. P. 3(a)(1). 
 89.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 18, at *9. 
 90.  Id. at *12–14.  
 91.  Id. at *16–17. 
 92.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 18, at *17. 
 93.  Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 439 (7th Cir. 1987). 
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Jennings also argues that he was not required to file a motion for a 
certificate of appealabilty in order to raise an alternate ground for 
affirmance.94 He again points to the text of the relevant statute, § 2253, 
emphasizing that “an appeal may not be taken” without a certificate 
of appealability. Because the State “took” the appeal, Jennings 
maintains that the statute does not require him to request a certificate 
of appealability.95 He argues that allowing alternate arguments 
without the certificate would not waste judicial resources because 
habeas petitioners who have won below have already established that 
their claims are not “frivolous.”96 Also, winning below gives habeas 
petitioners an incentive to advance only their best arguments because 
they now have a judgment in their favor to zealously defend.97 
Jennings alternatively argues that even if a habeas petitioner is 
required to obtain a certificate of appealability on a claim distinct 
from the claim he prevailed on, Jennings is only advancing an 
additional argument for his single ineffective assistance claim and is 
not raising a separate claim here.98 He argues that Strickland requires 
courts to weigh the cumulative effect of each act of deficient 
performance, and points to the Court’s use of the plural “errors” in its 
decision.99 He also argues the Strickland Court established that 
prejudice analysis for habeas is similar to the materiality analysis for 
suppression of evidence under United States v. Agurs.100 Just as a 
materiality analysis requires considering the cumulative effect of all 
evidence suppressed,101 so should a prejudice analysis consider all 
instances of deficient performance.  
In a final alternative argument, Jennings states that if all other 
arguments fail, the Fifth Circuit still had jurisdiction to grant a 
certificate of appealability because an appellee’s failure to request a 
certificate of appealability is not jurisdictional, even if an appellant’s 
failure is.102 Pursuant to this last argument, Jennings requests the case 
 
 94.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 18, at *18. 
 95.  Id. at *19. 
 96.  Id. at *22. 
 97.  Petitioner’s Reply Brief, Jennings v. Stephens, No. 13-7211 (U.S. Sep. 11, 2014), 2014 
WL 4557506, at *4. 
 98.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 18, at *26. 
 99.  Id. at *31 (quoting Strickland and compiling instances of uses of the plural when the 
Court is relating errors to prejudice). 
 100.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 18, at *32.  
 101.  See id. (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104, 112–13 (1976)). 
 102.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 18, at *35 (citing Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 
648 (2012) (holding that the requirement for an appellant petitioner to request a certificate of 
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be remanded to the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the circuit court did not 
issue a decision on the merits regarding his counsel’s deficient closing 
argument.103 
B.  Arguments for the State 
The State argues that Jennings sought to raise two distinct claims 
on appeal, one which the district court accepted, and the other which 
the court rejected.104 Jennings was therefore required to cross-appeal 
and to file a motion for a certificate of appealability on his claim that 
his counsel was ineffective in his closing argument, as both are needed 
to raise an alternate ground for affirmance.105 Further, because 
AEDPA requires a certificate of appealability to indicate the “specific 
issue or issues” that are debatable, Jennings needed a certificate for 
each additional issue within his ineffective assistance claim, even if all 
his allegations of deficient performance were part of the same claim.106 
The State contends that even if the Court rejects its arguments, the 
only relief available to Jennings is a remand for the consideration of 
his counsel’s closing argument, an issue that, the State contends, was 
rejected on the merits.107 
The State argues that Jennings’s appeal raised a claim rejected by 
the district court and requested additional relief from the court’s 
judgment.108 The district court’s conditional-release order was based 
on trial counsel’s failure to find and present mitigating evidence—
errors that constituted deficient performance under Wiggins.109 The 
State maintains that this Wiggins error was distinct from anything 
counsel did in his closing argument, and that the closing argument 
should be judged instead under the standard of Smith v. Spisak,110 
which only allows relief to be granted when there is a “reasonable 
probability” that an improved closing would have made a “significant 
difference.”111 Jennings was thus granted the relief of a new trial free 
from the Wiggins errors committed by counsel, and was requesting 
additional relief by asking the Fifth Circuit to grant him a trial free 
 
appealability is jurisdictional, but “defects” in the certificate process are not)). 
 103.  Petitioner’s Reply Brief, supra note 97, at *20. 
 104.  Brief for the Respondent, supra note 9, at *7.  
 105.  Id. at *5–6. 
 106.  Id. at *6.  
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. at *7. 
 109.  Id. at *8. 
 110.  558 U.S. 139, 151 (2010).  
 111.  Brief for the Respondent, supra note 9, at *47. 
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from Spisak errors.112 
The State supports this theory with language from Strickland, 
contending that because a “convicted defendant making a claim of 
ineffective assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel 
that are alleged not to have been the result of professional judgment,” 
that each failure to use “reasonable professional judgment” is the 
basis for its own ineffectiveness claim.113 The State also cites Trevino v. 
Thaler,114 which held that a petitioner had defaulted on a claim of 
ineffective assistance under Wiggins but that he had properly raised a 
claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to hearsay.115 
Because the Trevino Court differentiated the two theories of 
ineffectiveness and called each a “claim,” the State asserts that 
ineffective assistance of counsel cannot always be a single 
claim.116Viewing the two claims as independent leads not only to the 
conclusion that Jennings was requesting additional relief, but also that 
he was attempting to change the disposition of a claim, and therefore 
must cross-appeal even if he had not been requesting additional 
relief.117 
Further, that state contends that even assuming arguendo that 
Jennings did not need to cross-appeal, he should still need a certificate 
of appealability.118 Requiring a certificate even for a petitioner who is 
successful in district court will keep meritless alternate claims from 
wasting the appellate court’s time.119 The State identifies this case as a 
shining example of a meritless claim being raised on appeal that was 
rejected by the district court.120 Section 2253’s use of the phrase 
“specific issue or issues” shows a concern not with the appeals of 
habeas applicants, but with the issues they raise—it does not matter 
who is “taking” the appeal. A certificate of appealability is still 
 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. at *32. 
 114.  Brief for the Respondent, supra note 9, at *33. 
 115.  Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1915 (2013). 
 116.  Brief for the Respondent, supra note 9, at *33. 
 117.  Id. at *23–25. The State also cites Helvering v. Pfeiffer, 302 U.S. 247 (1937) and 
Alexander v. Cosden Pipe Line Co., 290 U.S. 484 (1934) as examples of cases where the 
appellee did not seek to change the relief granted but was required to cross-appeal nonetheless 
because they sought to change the disposition of an individual claim. In each case, the appellee 
argued for a monetary judgment to be upheld on different grounds. The State argues that relief 
of multiple claims cannot be more “fungible” than a monetary claim and should therefore be 
seen as two claims. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 9, at *23–25. 
 118.  Id. at *50.  
 119.  Id. at *42. 
 120.  Id. at *43. 
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required for the habeas petitioner if he is arguing issues not 
supported by the district court’s judgment.121 
IV.  ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION 
This case turns on whether or not Jennings’s counsel’s errors were 
part of the same claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, and the 
policy rationales for the petitioner’s stance clearly outweigh those 
against it. The Court should rule (1) that ineffective assistance of 
counsel is a single claim with a deficient performance prong and a 
cumulative prejudice prong; and (2) that habeas petitioners who 
succeed at the district court level should not be required to cross-
appeal or obtain a certificate of appealability to raise alternate 
arguments for affirmance. 
The Court should first answer whether Jennings raised a single 
claim or multiple claims in the circuit court. Though the question of 
whether or not the prejudice prong of Strickland is cumulative was 
not explicitly raised in the question for which the Court granted 
certiorari,122 the Court should take this opportunity to decide it, as the 
circuits are split on the issue and its resolution will inform the 
outcome of this case. As Jennings notes, the Strickland Court 
repeatedly used the plural “errors” when describing the prejudice 
prong of an ineffective assistance claim.123 It logically follows that the 
Court’s decision was based on an attorney making multiple errors 
together in light of this wording.124 
Further, this holding would be good policy. Viewing each 
deficiency as its own claim allows a court to grant relief on habeas 
review only when one single mistake was bad enough to be outcome 
determinative.125 If trial counsel committed numerous errors, each just 
below that threshold, no relief could be granted. A jury, however, 
views the trial as a whole, so though one of these near fatal mistakes 
may not have determined the outcome, the combination of several 
could have. Viewing ineffective assistance of counsel as a single, 
cumulative claim therefore allows courts to apply this outcome-
determinative standard in a way that is more in line with how trials 
 
 121.  Id. at *46. 
 122.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7, at *37. 
 123.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 18, at *31. 
 124.  See McLaughlin, supra note 8, at 880 (“[T]he Court’s repeated use of errors, as a 
plural, suggests a broader intent for the ineffective assistance analysis.”). 
 125.  Id. at 881. 
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are actually decided. 
If the Court finds that prejudice can be cumulated across multiple 
deficiencies, it should turn next to whether multiple instances of 
deficient performance constitute separate claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Here, the Court should hold that ineffective 
assistance is indeed a single claim. The State notes that separate 
claims can have “overlapping element[s]” without becoming a single 
claim, and argues that even if prejudice is cumulative, ineffective 
assistance of counsel should still not be viewed as a unitary claim.126 
But such a stance does not follow logically from the language of 
Strickland. Both deficiency and prejudice are required for a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. If multiple deficiencies can be 
combined for a single determination of prejudice, then the State’s 
suggested reading of ineffective assistance would require combining 
the first element from several claims to satisfy the second element for 
each of those claims. This concept is confusing and an unnatural 
reading of the language. Finding ineffective assistance to be one claim 
instead, where the first element can include one or several instances 
of deficient performance, is cleaner and adheres more closely to 
Strickland’s language. 
The State cautions that this holding “would shift the playing field 
in the State’s favor” by barring claims of ineffectiveness that were 
discovered after the state court proceedings, as most state habeas 
cases contain an ineffective assistance claim.127 There are conflicting 
opinions in the lower courts on what effect this finding would have,128 
however, and there are options open to the courts to remedy an 
inequity arising from a unitary approach to ineffective assistance of 
counsel.129 
The remaining issue, whether a petitioner ever needs to file a 
cross-appeal or motion for a certificate of appealability after 
prevailing in district court, is not as clear-cut. Though here, viewing 
 
 126.  Brief for the Respondent, supra note 9, at *35. 
 127.  Id. at *38 (citing Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1395 (2011)). 
 128.  Petitioner’s Reply Brief, supra note 97, at *20 (comparing United States v. Galloway, 
56 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that ineffective assistance of counsel was one claim, but 
that raising the claim on direct appeal did not bar the assertion of another ineffectiveness on a 
different ground) with Peoples v. United States, 403 F.3d 844 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that new 
allegations of ineffective assistance on habeas were barred by law-of-the-case doctrine)). 
 129.  Id. (citing Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (2000) and Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 
1309 (2012) as cases that would allow a court to entertain “a substantial but procedurally barred 
IAC claim upon an adequate showing of ‘cause’ and ‘prejudice’ for the default.”). 
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ineffective assistance as a single claim leads to the conclusion that 
Jennings did not need to file a cross-appeal or a motion for a 
certificate of appealability, Jennings argues that neither is ever needed 
when the habeas petitioner is the appellee.130 The Court could offer a 
narrow holding, deciding this case only on the argument that 
ineffectiveness is one claim and thus a cross-appeal or certificate of 
appealability were not required because the Fifth Circuit already had 
jurisdiction over that single issue.  If the Court takes on this question, 
it should rule in favor of habeas petitioners who have already had to 
overcome high standards to arrive at this stage of litigation. 
Requiring a habeas petitioner who prevailed below to file a cross-
appeal and a motion for a certificate of appealability would seemingly 
eliminate the problem of petitioners throwing any conceivable 
argument they could find at the court, thus saving judges time from 
having to read, consider, and respond to meritless arguments.131 
However, the Court should still hold that neither a cross-appeal nor a 
certificate of appealability is required for a habeas petitioner to argue 
alternate grounds of affirmance for his relief. Having already 
overcome the extraordinarily high bar of habeas review at the district 
court, the petitioners will have meritorious claims to advance. Though 
they would also be able to raise meritless arguments on appeal if 
there were no requirement for a certificate of appealability, 
petitioners at this stage now have something precious to lose, as they 
have a judgment in their favor to protect, and thus they will be more 
inclined to advance their best arguments. 
Finally, though this case presents an opportunity for the Court to 
resolve several significant procedural issues in habeas law, it may not 
matter for Jennings himself. As the state notes at the close of its brief, 
the Fifth Circuit is unlikely to find that his attorney’s closing 
argument was deficient performance, and is even less likely to find 
that it was prejudicial.132 Even if Jennings wins on the procedural 
question presented to the Supreme Court, his petition is ultimately 
 
 130.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 18, at *9. 
 131.  Id. at *40 (noting the need to focus attention solely on meritorious claims) (citing 
Romans v. Abrams, 790 F.2d 244, 245 (2d Cir. 1986)). 
 132.  See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 9, at *49 (noting that the Fifth Circuit 
dismissed his motion for a certificate of appealability and thus does not consider the issue 
substantial); see also Brief Amicus Curiae of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation in Support 
of Neither Party at 24–25, Jennings v. Stephens, No. 13-7211 (U.S. June 17, 2014), 2014 WL 
2902016 (noting that the district court correctly analyzed this point under the “doubly 
deferential” Strickland standard). 
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unlikely to prevail on the merits. So though his case should bring 
increased efficiency to habeas proceedings, Jennings may have only 
ended up buying himself extra time, a picture of the very inefficiency 
that AEDPA and this case are meant to guard against. 
CONCLUSION 
In Jennings v. Stephens, the Court has the opportunity to speak to 
several issues upon which the federal circuit courts need better 
guidance. The Court should seize this opportunity, as these cases 
present life or death questions, and unifying the lower courts will 
bolster confidence in what are crucial, often mortal, decisions. The 
Court should find for Jennings, as his arguments offer the clearest 
standards and hew closest to the text of AEDPA and Strickland. And 
though ruling for Jennings in this case may not spare him, it will help 
future habeas petitioners who have been denied their Sixth 
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. 
 
